Federal Law PL 94-142 provides handicapped children with appropriate education. Parents of handicapped children, if dissatisfied, can make and arbitrate a claim for a different education program for their child. In 1980, under this law California instituted mediation as a less expensive and adversarial alternative to a state hearing. Early evaluation suggested that arbitration was costly, adversarial, and socioeconomically biased, but these studies were done before mediation was introduced and were limited by small samples. The present study explored whether participants profit economically from pursuing their claims, whether arbitration is worthwhile only under certain conditions, and whether mediation is economically attractive.
Forty California families and thirty school districts reported on arbitration costs, benefits, and outcomes. Costs of expert assistance and of time spent were estimated; benefits were derived from an earlier study of the costs of special education programs; probabilities of success were estimated; net expected values were calculated for different durations of benefit payout, types of legal representation, and claim types; and correlations among parameters and arbitration route were explored. Two realistic case scenarios--a mediation case and a state hearing case--were interpreted to identify characteristics that make for a "tough" case, and participant comments on satisfaction and hidden costs were analyzed.
Generally, the benefits of arbitration justified the costs for both parties, although the benefit varied with case parameters. Combinations of claim type, legal representation, and arbitration route that led to the highest net benefit for each party were identified. The consistent "winners" were outside consultants and legal representatives. Mediation generally produced the intended cost reduction and lessening of opposition. Both parents and districts said they preferred mediation, that mediation made the continuing parent-school relationship better, and that mediation was less stressful.
Some participant actions were unaccountable by economic rationality. For example, districts and parents paid to dispute some claims far beyond their value. District actions could not always be accounted for by the economics of a single case; districts sometimes defend against future claims by taking a hard position now. Emotional costs and loss of the family's goodwill toward the schools also accounted for departures from economic rationality.(Abstract by Author)