

# JUDICIAL ETHICS FOR Hearing Officials

Professional Development for IDEA Hearing Officers

November 9 and 10 2021

CADRE

# Hearing officials and Judicial Ethics

- Hearing officials (executive branch judges) may be subject to the same ethical standards as judges in the judicial branch of government. This will depend on the jurisdiction. For our purposes, we will assume that Hearing officials are subject to the same standards and will discuss judicial ethics standards based upon the ABA Model Code of Judicial conduct as well as statutory law governing disqualification of judges.

# Judges friends and Recusal 1

- AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDING COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Formal Opinion 488 September 5, 2019 Judges' Social or Close Personal Relationships with Lawyers or Parties as Grounds for Disqualification or Disclosure Rule 2.11 of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct identifies situations in which judges must disqualify themselves in proceedings because their impartiality might reasonably be questioned— including cases implicating some familial and personal relationships—but it is silent with respect to obligations imposed by other relationships.

# Judges friends and Recusal 2

- This opinion identifies three categories of relationships between judges and lawyers or parties to assist judges in evaluating ethical obligations those relationships may create under Rule 2.11: (1) acquaintanceships; (2) friendships; and (3) close personal relationships. In short, judges need not disqualify themselves if a lawyer or party is an acquaintance, nor must they disclose acquaintanceships to the other lawyers or parties. Whether judges must disqualify themselves when a party or lawyer is a friend or shares a close personal relationship with the judge or should instead take the lesser step of disclosing the friendship or close personal relationship to the other lawyers and parties, depends on the circumstances. Judges' disqualification in any of these situations may be waived in accordance and compliance with Rule 2.11(C) of the Model Code.<sup>1</sup>

# Judges friends and Recusal 3

- The Committee has been asked to address judges' obligation to disqualify themselves in proceedings in which they have social or close personal relationships with the lawyers or parties other than a spousal, domestic partner, or other close family relationship. Rule 2.11 of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct ("Model Code") lists situations in which judges must disqualify themselves in proceedings because their impartiality might reasonably be questioned—including cases implicating some specific family and personal relationships—but the rule provides no guidance with respect to the types of relationships addressed in this opinion.

# Judges friends and Recusal 4

- 1. Acquaintances: When the judge is an acquaintance of a lawyer or party to the lawsuit, there is no duty to disclose the relationship or for the judge to disqualify themselves from deciding the case.
- 2. Friends: When the judge is friends with a lawyer or party to the lawsuit, the judge should disclose the friendship but disqualification may not be required. This is a question of degree.
- 3. Close personal relationship: Judges that have a romantic relationship with a lawyer or party to the lawsuit must disqualify themselves from deciding that case.

# Judge's fact investigation 1

- **AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDING COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Formal Opinion 478 December 8, 2017 Independent Factual Research by Judges Via the Internet**
- Easy access to a vast amount of information available on the Internet exposes judges to potential ethical problems. Judges risk violating the Model Code of Judicial Conduct by searching the Internet for information related to participants or facts in a proceeding. Independent investigation of adjudicative facts generally is prohibited unless the information is properly subject to judicial notice. The restriction on independent investigation includes individuals subject to the judge's direction and control.

# Judge's fact investigation 2

- 1 I. Introduction The Internet provides immediate access to an unprecedented amount of information. Internet searches offer a vast array of information on endless topics. Social media sites provide extensive information that users share about themselves and others. Information discovered on the Internet may be highly educational and as useful to judges as judicial seminars and books. But information gathered from an Internet search may not be accurate. It may be biased, unreliable, or false. And, whether truthful or not, information discovered by a judge via the Internet that does not qualify for judicial notice and is not disclosed to the parties is untested by the adversary process.<sup>2</sup> To help the judiciary navigate the hazards of Internet research, this opinion reviews the ethical parameters under the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct for conducting on-line independent fact-finding not tested by the adversary system. <sup>3</sup> .....

# Judge's fact investigation 3

- .... IV. Conclusion The Internet provides useful tools for discovering vast amounts of information. Searching reliable sources on the Internet may reveal information that educates, informs, and enlightens the judiciary, not unlike judicial seminars and printed materials. Information properly subject to judicial notice is well within the judge's discretion to search and use according to the applicable law. On the other hand, adjudicative facts that are needed to determine an issue in a case, but which are not properly subject to judicial notice, may not be researched without violating Rule 2.9(C). Stated simply, a judge should not gather adjudicative facts from any source on the Internet unless the information is subject to proper judicial notice. Further, and within the guidelines set forth in this opinion, judges should not use the Internet for independent fact-gathering related to a pending or impending matter where the parties can easily be asked to research or provide the information. The same is true of the activities or characteristics of the litigants or other participants in the matter.

# Judge's fact investigation 4

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# Adjudicative facts 1

- Rule 201. Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts
- **(a) Scope.** This rule governs judicial notice of an adjudicative fact only, not a legislative fact.
- **(b) Kinds of Facts That May Be Judicially Noticed.** The court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it:
  - (1) is generally known within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction; or
  - (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
- **(c) Taking Notice.** The court:
  - (1) may take judicial notice on its own; or
  - (2) must take judicial notice if a party requests it and the court is supplied with the necessary information.
- **(d) Timing.** The court may take judicial notice at any stage of the proceeding.

# Adjudicative facts 2

- **(e) Opportunity to Be Heard.** On timely request, a party is entitled to be heard on the propriety of taking judicial notice and the nature of the fact to be noticed. If the court takes judicial notice before notifying a party, the party, on request, is still entitled to be heard.
- **(f) Instructing the Jury.** In a civil case, the court must instruct the jury to accept the noticed fact as conclusive. In a criminal case, the court must instruct the jury that it may or may not accept the noticed fact as conclusive.
- **NOTES**

# Adjudicative facts 3

- ***NOTES***

- *Subdivision (a)*. This is the only evidence rule on the subject of judicial notice. It deals only with judicial notice of “adjudicative” facts. No rule deals with judicial notice of “legislative” facts. Judicial notice of matters of foreign law is treated in [Rule 44.1](#) of the [Federal Rules of Civil Procedure](#) and [Rule 26.1](#) of the [Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure](#).

# Adjudicative facts 4

- The omission of any treatment of legislative facts results from fundamental differences between adjudicative facts and legislative facts. Adjudicative facts are simply the facts of the particular case. Legislative facts, on the other hand, are those which have relevance to legal reasoning and the lawmaking process, whether in the formulation of a legal principle or ruling by a judge or court or in the enactment of a legislative body. The terminology was coined by Professor Kenneth Davis in his article *An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process*, 55 Harv.L.Rev. 364, 404-407 (1942). The following discussion draws extensively upon his writings. In addition, see the same author's *Judicial Notice*, 55 Colum.L. Rev. 945 (1955); *Administrative Law Treatise*, ch. 15 (1958); *A System of Judicial Notice Based on Fairness and Convenience*, in *Perspectives of Law* 69 (1964).

# Adjudicative facts 5

- The usual method of establishing adjudicative facts is through the introduction of evidence, ordinarily consisting of the testimony of witnesses. If particular facts are outside of reasonable controversy, this process is dispensed with as unnecessary. A high degree of indisputability is the essential prerequisite.

# Judges use of social media for law statements 1

- California Opinion 2021-042 (April 28, 2021)
- Can judges make law related statements on social media?
- **Advice Provided** “Judges may use social media to make statements relating to the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice, but should consider the following when posting or engaging with others online: (1) the same standards for judicial communications that apply in face-to-face settings apply with equal force to online statements and social media posts; (2) due to lack of control over the dissemination and permanence of online statements, judges must exercise caution and restraint and should assume the widest possible audience;

# Judges use of social media for law statements 2

- (3) while statements concerning the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice are generally permissible, judges may not engage in prohibited social or political commentary on social media; and (4) judges must carefully evaluate what they intend to post and continually monitor their social media communications and posts to ensure public confidence in the integrity, independence, and impartiality of the judiciary.”

# Judges use of social media for law statements 3

- Massachusetts judicial ethics opinion No 2021-01 (3 18 2021)
- Judge with knowledge of another judges face book posts related to 2020 election must report judge to judicial discipline authorities. Sample screenshots of judges face book posts include
- “The screenshots show a number of posts and messages on the judge’s Facebook profile between October 6, 2020, and November 14, 2020 [2]. They include:
- Expressions of support for one of the major party candidates for president;
- References and links to negative coverage of the opposing major party's candidate;

# Judges use of social media for law statements 4

- Statements that the opposing party's candidate and his family are “corrupt”;
- Posts ridiculing and demeaning two female politicians of the opposing party;
- Derogatory comments about immigrant parents who were separated from their children at the southern border;
- Complaints about media bias in election reporting; and
- Ten days after the election, a statement that the election was a “mess” along with a link to commentary by a media personality claiming that the election was fundamentally unfair, compromised by alleged voting irregularities, and manipulated for the political benefit of the opposing party.”

# Social media connections 1

- Judges and Lawyers
- Question Raised: Can a judge (or any decision-maker) friend an attorney who might appear before him or her, and vice versa?
- Several jurisdictions have issued opinions on this very matter. Many more, however, have not. So, the definitive answer depends on where you live. Some jurisdictions have responded, but, in doing so, have not necessarily framed the issue in the same way.
-

# Social media connections 2

- 1. Can a judge be on facebook/social media sites?
- All 7 opinions say YES - 1 is qualified)
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- Kentucky Opinion JE-119: Yes
- Oklahoma Opinion 2011-3: Yes
- California Opinion 66: Yes
- Florida Opinion 2010-06: Yes
- Ohio Opinion 2010-7: Yes
- Massachusetts Opinion 2011-6: Yes, but may not identify him or herself as a judge
- New York Opinion 2010-2: Yes
-

# Social media connections 3

- 2. Can a judge friend lawyers?
- 
- Florida Opinion 2010-06: Yes - if atty does not appear or is unlikely to appear
- Kentucky Opinion JE-119: Yes (implied)
- Oklahoma Opinion 2011-3: Yes, those lawyers who do not regularly appear or are unlikely to appear in the Judge's court.
- California Opinion 66: Yes (implied)
- New York - Yes
- Mass- (open question)
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# Social media connections 4

- 3. Can a judge friend lawyers who “may appear” before him or her?
- 
- Florida Opinion 2009-20: No
- Ohio Opinion 2010-7: Yes - but must be vigilant
- Kentucky Opinion JE-119: Yes (qualified)
- Oklahoma Opinion 2011-3: No
- California Opinion 66: Yes (qualified)
- Massachusetts Opinion 2011-6: No
- New York - Yes
- 
- Can a judge friend a lawyer actually appearing on a case?
- (based on earlier determinations, only 2 states even get to this question)
- 
- Ohio - Yes - but maintain vigilance.
- California - No in pending case before the Judge: May NOT friend anew, must “de-friend” if already friends, and must make this known,

# Social media connections 5

- TIPS
- An attorney, a judge or a decision-maker is not relieved of ethical responsibilities when engaging in social media.
- Be on guard when communications stray into pending case matters. You do not want to engage in ex parte communications
- Attorneys and judges and state agency employees are all well-advised to proceed with caution if they are “friends” on social networking sites.

# Judges Ethics 1

- In New York, a judge was reprimanded in part because he used his Facebook account to provide details of his location and schedule, up-dated his status while on the bench, posted a photograph of his crowded courtroom to his account, and invited several lawyers to be his friends on Facebook.
- **Source:** See Molly McDonough, *Was Judge Transferred Because of His Facebook Activity?*, ABA Journal, Oct. 16, 2009, [http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/was\\_judge\\_transferred\\_because\\_of\\_his\\_facebook\\_activity](http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/was_judge_transferred_because_of_his_facebook_activity).

# Judges Ethics 2

A North Carolina judge was reprimanded for “friending” a lawyer in a case pending before him, posting and reading messages about the litigation on Facebook, and accessing the website of an opposing party in a child custody and support case. Can a Judge post comments about the lawyers on Facebook regarding a particular case and/or the parties, i.e. “that lawyer did a lousy job trying their case”?.?

- **Source:** Debra Cassens Weiss, *Judge Reprimanded for Friending Lawyer and Googling Litigant*, ABA Journal. com, June 1. 2009, available at [www.abajournal.com/news/judge\\_reprimanded\\_for\\_friending\\_lawyer\\_and\\_googling\\_litigant](http://www.abajournal.com/news/judge_reprimanded_for_friending_lawyer_and_googling_litigant);

# Judges Ethics 3 A

- In North Carolina, a judge received a public reprimand for social networking misconduct.<sup>3</sup> That case involved child custody dispute. While the case was pending, the judge and the father's counsel became Facebook "friends," and thereafter exchanged relatively innocuous ex parte statements. Further, the North Carolina judge used an internet site to perform his own investigation of the mother. *See Public Reprimand of Terry, North Carolina Judicial Standards Commission, Inquiry No. 08-234, April 1, 2009.*

# Judges Ethics 4

- A Florida judge was disqualified in a criminal case because the judge had become face book friends with the prosecutor, and the defendant challenged the judge's ability to be fair and impartial.
- Domville v. State of Florida, No. 4D12-556,2012 WL 3826764 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. September 5, 2012)[http://www.4dca.org/opinions/Sept 2012/09-05-12/4D12-556.op.pdf](http://www.4dca.org/opinions/Sept%202012/09-05-12/4D12-556.op.pdf)

# ALJ judicial ethics articles 1

- **Articles on ALJs and Judicial Ethics, Listed Chronologically**
- 1. David C. Barnett, Samuel S. Frankel, Jr., & Liza E. Lima, Discovery Issues And Ethical Considerations Under The Rules Of Practice And Procedure For Administrative Hearings Before The Office Of Administrative Law Judges, 13 Loy. Mar. L.J. 1 (2014)
- 2. Daniel F. Solomon, Fundamental Fairness, Judicial Efficiency And Uniformity: Revisiting The Administrative Procedure Act, 33 J. Nat'l Ass'n Admin. L. Judiciary 52 (2013)
- 3. Steven A. Glazer, Toward A Model Code Of Judicial Conduct For Federal Administrative Law Judges, 64 Admin. L. Rev. 337 (2012)

# ALJ judicial ethics articles 2

- 4. Diana Gillis, Closing An Administrative Loophole: Ethics For The Administrative Judiciary, 22 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 863 (2009)
- 5. Edwin L. Felter, Jr., Accountability In The Administrative Law Judiciary: The Right And The Wrong Kind, 86 Denv. U. L. Rev. 157 (2008)
- 6. Harold J. Krent & Lindsay DuVall, Accommodating Alj Decision Making Independence With Institutional Interests Of The Administrative Judiciary, 25 J. Natl Assn Admin. L. Judges 1 (2005)

# ALJ judicial ethics articles 3

- 7. Symposium: Modern Ethical Dilemmas for ALJs and Government Lawyers: Conflicts of Interest, Appearances of Impropriety, and Other Ethical Considerations
- Power, Robert C., Modern Ethical Dilemmas for ALJs and Government Lawyers: Conflicts of Interest, Appearances of Impropriety, and Other Ethical Considerations - Introduction Symposium: Modern Ethical Dilemmas for ALJs and Government Lawyers: Conflicts of Interest, Appearances of Impropriety, and Other Ethical Considerations, 11 Widener J. Pub. L. 1 (2002)

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- 8. Patricia E. Salkin, Judging Ethics For Administrative Law Judges: Adoption Of A Uniform Code Of Judicial Conduct For The Administrative Judiciary, 11 Widener J. Pub. L. 7 (2002)
- 9. Gedid, John L., ALJ Ethics: Conundrums, Dilemmas, and Paradoxes Symposium: Modern Ethical Dilemmas for ALJs and Government Lawyers: Conflicts of Interest, Appearances of Impropriety, and Other Ethical Considerations, 11 Widener J. Pub. L. 33 (2002)
- 10. Christianson, Robert A., Thoughts Relating to the Proposal of a Uniform Code of Judicial Conduct for Administrative Law Judges Symposium: Modern Ethical Dilemmas for ALJs and Government Lawyers: Conflicts of Interest, Appearances of Impropriety, and Other Ethical Considerations, 11 Widener J. Pub. L. 57 (2002)

# ALJ judicial ethics articles 5

- 11. Lee, Randy, The State of Self-Regulation of the Legal Profession: Have We Locked the Fox in the Chicken
- Coop Symposium: Modern Ethical Dilemmas for ALJs and Government Lawyers: Conflicts of Interest, Appearances of Impropriety, and Other Ethical Considerations, 11 Widener J. Pub. L. 69 (2002)
- 12. Johnston, Patrick J., Amended Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.11: Long-Standing Controversy, Imperfect Remedy, and New Questions Symposium: Modern Ethical Dilemmas for ALJs and Government Lawyers: Conflicts of Interest, Appearances of Impropriety, and Other Ethical Considerations, 11 Widener J. Pub. L. 83 (2002)

# Judicial independence and impartiality

- 1. Due process of law requires an impartial decision maker (*Goldberg v. Kelley*, 397 U.S. 254, 1970).
- ALJ independence is essential to impartial decision making in administrative agencies.
- Appointment of ALJ's by agency heads (as required by the *Lucia* decision) can create challenges to ALJ independence unless ALJ's have civil service protections against removal unless there is good cause.

# Lucia v. SEC decision 1

- Lucia v. Securities Exchange Commission (June 21, 2018) 138 S. Ct. 2044. In this decision, the Supreme Court held that Administrative law judges (ALJ's) were Officers of the United States but did not require senatorial confirmation because they were "inferior Officers" that could be appointed by the President, courts of law, or department heads [U.S Const., Art. II, Section 2, Clause 2]. Lucia was subject to SEC sanctions following an administrative hearing before an SEC ALJ. That ALJ was not appointed by the Commission but by a subordinate official of the SEC. The supreme court reversed the SEC decision and remanded the case back to the SEC for a new hearing before a properly appointed ALJ.

# Lucia Decision 2

- Prior to the Lucia decision, federal ALJ's were selected by agencies after qualifying for a civil service appointment under standards developed by the Office of Personnel Management. ALJ's were considered to be employees who held office in good standing and could not be removed from office except for good cause. ALJ's could challenge removals under hearing procedures administered by the federal Merit Systems Protection Board.
- The Lucia majority held that ALJ's were inferior officers because they occupied a continuing position established by law and they exercised significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States.

# Lucia Decision 3

- Following the Lucia decision, President Trump issued an executive order requiring ALJ's to be selected by agency heads, and exempting those ALJ's from the merit based hiring process known as the competitive civil service. The Trump administration stated that the executive order implemented the holding of the Lucia case.
- Many leaders in the ALJ community as well as some members of Congress oppose the executive order and have expressed concerns that this new approach could impair an ALJ's ability to issue impartial decisions and to disagree with agency heads in particular cases. The pre Lucia approach emphasized the judicial model for ALJ independence whereas this executive order approach emphasizes the institutional model of agency decision making .

# ALJ independence

- 1. ALJ's need to be independent to satisfy impartial decision maker requirements of due process of law. This is called the judicial model for ALJ decision making.
- 2. Agency heads orientation focuses more on getting the job done, and being successful at the mission of the agency. This is called the institutional model for decision making.
- 3. These two models can easily clash particularly if the agency head wants the ALJ to rule in favor of the agency in a high percentage of cases that the ALJ is responsible for deciding.

# Ex parte contacts sanctions

- Reversal of a decision for improper ex parte contacts between a decision maker and a lawyer for a party.
- Arbitration decision Grabowski v. Kaiser Foundation Health Care plan, Inc. 64 Cal. App. 5<sup>th</sup> 67 (2021)
- The court “held that arbitrator’s failure to disclose ex parte communication with health care provider’s counsel about claimant’s self-represented status required vacation of arbitration award.”

# Hypothetical One A 1

- 1. ALJ Smith is assigned to hear medical licensing cases. Smith has been assigned to hear the case of medical licensing board v. Caldwell, in which the Board is seeking suspension of a doctor's license for repeatedly writing medical exemption letters for parents who do not want their children to be vaccinated against Measles and Mumps. Doctor Caldwell has been charged with writing those letters and making diagnoses that are not medically justified. Smith is a member of the Parents Against Vaccines organization (PAV) (which advocates for broad exemptions to mandatory vaccine laws).
- 
- A. Should Smith tell the Board attorney (deputy attorney general) or Caldwell's attorney (a private lawyer) about his PAV affiliation, or is this something that the litigants do not need to know, as Smith knows how to be a fair judge? (See ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.11(A))
-

# Hypothetical One A 2

- D.C. Rules of Jud. Conduct Rule 2.9
- **CANON 2 A JUDGE SHALL PERFORM THE DUTIES OF JUDICIAL OFFICE IMPARTIALLY, COMPETENTLY, AND DILIGENTLY**
- 
- **Rule 2.11 Disqualification .**
- 
- **(A) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which**
- **The judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to the following circumstances**
-

# Hypothetical One B, and C 1

- B. Suppose ALJ Smith does tell the parties, and the deputy attorney general moves to disqualify Smith under ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.11(A)?. What should Judge Smith do? Is he/she required to follow the code of ethics for judges? Isn't that code only for judges in the judicial branch? Should Judge Smith grant the motion to disqualify or not?
- 
- C. Suppose ALJ Smith does NOT tell the parties, and Smith's membership is discovered by the parties AFTER his decision is made? What should Judge Smith do now? Would any of your responses change if Smith were the national president of the PAV Society?
-

# Hypothetical One B and C 2

- 28 U.S.C. Section 455 (disqualification of judges)
- (a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.  
[statutory disqualification]
- Comment: Judges may recuse themselves or may be subject to a party disqualification motion.

# Financial Interests: Hypothetical

## Two A 1

- 2. ALJ Jones is a member of a federal agency that adjudicates disability cases. The following two proposals for pay incentives have been proposed by the agency to provide salary enhancements for excellent work by federal ALJ's :
- 
- A) Incentive pay of \$5,000 per year for each ALJ when an ALJ issues a minimum of ten recommended decisions per year terminating disability benefits or upholding denial of disability benefits in which the aggregate of benefit dollars saved per benefit year exceeds \$50,000.;

# Financial Interests: Hypothetical

## Two A 2

- B. Relevant Case Law
- 
- 1. Tumey v. State of Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). The due process right to an impartial decision maker was violated when defendant was convicted by a judge whose salary was based in part upon the fines and costs levied by him acting in a judicial capacity. The judge's salary was larger if he imposed more fines on defendants in his court. This is a disqualifying financial interest.



# Financial Interests: Hypothetical

## Two A 3

- **D.C. Rules of Jud. Conduct Rule 2.11**
- **CANON 2 A JUDGE SHALL PERFORM THE DUTIES OF JUDICIAL OFFICE IMPARTIALLY, COMPETENTLY, AND DILIGENTLY**
- 
- **Rule 2.11 Disqualification .**
- 
- **(A) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which**
- **The judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to the following circumstances**
- 
- **(3) The judge knows that he or she, individually or as a fiduciary,\* or the judge's spouse, domestic partner, parent, or child, wherever residing, or any other member of the judge's family residing in the judge's household,\* has an economic interest\* in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding.**

# Financial Interests: Hypothetical

## Two B 1

- B) Augmented travel budgets of \$50,000 per year for the agency ALJ's office when the supervising ALJ certifies that ALJ's in each regional office have met the goals set forth (ten termination or upholding of denials of benefits per year, with \$50,000 in benefit saved ).

# Financial Interests: Hypothetical

## Two B 2

- Ward v. Village of Monroeville, Ohio, 409 U.S. 57 (1972). The due process right to an impartial decision maker was violated when the judge before whom petitioner was compelled to stand trial for traffic offenses was also the Mayor of the town and was responsible for village finances, and the mayor's court through fines, forfeitures, costs and fees, provided a substantial portion of the village funds. This is a disqualifying financial interest.

# Financial Interests: Hypothetical

## Two C 1

- C) ALJ Jones rejected the application of the medical vocational guidelines to benefits claimant Smith who has a 5<sup>th</sup> grade education, worked as a maid in a hotel, and has severe back problems precluding her prior work. The guidelines would have provided that Smith could do light work thereby making her ineligible for disability benefits. Jones found that she was eligible for disability benefits. Jones' decision to reject the guidelines was ultimately affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. At the time Jones adjudicated this matter, Jones' adult daughter had suffered from severe back problems, and her disability benefits application would not have been granted but for the appellate court upholding of the rejection of the medical vocational guidelines in the Smith case. Jones primarily based his decision on the merits of Smith's case, but he was affected by his adult daughter's struggles to overcome her medical problems.

# Financial Interests: Hypothetical

## Two C 2

- Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986).  
Justice's participation in case violated insurer's due process rights in an action seeking punitive damages for insurer's alleged bad-faith refusal to pay valid claim where Justice, at time he cast the deciding vote and authored the court's opinion, had pending at least one very similar bad faith refusal-to-pay lawsuit against an insurer in another state court. The Justice's interest in this case was direct, personal, substantial, and pecuniary.

# Ex Parte Communications:

## Hypothetical 3 A 1

- 3. ALJ Jones is employed by a federal agency that adjudicates personnel matters for federal employees. Jones has been assigned to hear the following cases with specific scheduled hearing dates. Jones receives the following communications:
  - 
  - A) In the Department of Veteran Affairs v. Smith, Jones receives an e-mail from Dr. Smith in which Smith states: “Please postpone my June 15<sup>th</sup> hearing date for two months because I have fired my lawyer, Brown, and I am going to represent myself. Oh, by the way, does it matter that my main defense witness, my former nurse, Mr. Jeans, is refusing to voluntarily show up at the hearing?” ALJ Jones knows that the government attorney representing the federal agency is opposed to all postponements in these cases.

# Ex Parte Communications:

## Hypothetical 3 A 2

- D.C. Rules of Jud. Conduct Rule 2.9
- **CANON 2 A JUDGE SHALL PERFORM THE DUTIES OF JUDICIAL OFFICE IMPARTIALLY, COMPETENTLY, AND DILIGENTLY**
- 
- **Rule 2.9. Ex Parte Communications**
- 
- **(A) A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, or consider other communications made to the judge outside the presence of the parties or their lawyers, concerning a pending\* or impending matter,\* except as follows:**
  - **(1) When circumstances require it, ex parte communication for scheduling, administrative, or emergency purposes, which does not address substantive matters, is permitted, provided:**
    - **(a) the judge reasonably believes that no party will gain a procedural, substantive, or tactical advantage as a result of the ex parte communication; and**
    - **(b) the judge makes provision promptly to notify all other parties of the substance of the ex parte communication, and gives the parties an opportunity to respond.....**

# Ex Parte Communications:

## Hypothetical 3 A 3

- 5 U.S.C. Section 551 (14), definition of ex parte communication
- (14) "ex parte communication" means an oral or written communication not on the public record with respect to which reasonable prior notice to all parties is not given, but it shall not include requests for status reports on any matter.
- 5 U.S.C. Section 557(d),
- (d)(1) In any agency proceeding which is subject to subsection (a) of this section, except to the extent required for the disposition of ex parte matters as authorized by law--
  - (A) no interested person outside the agency shall make or knowingly cause to be made to any member of the body comprising the agency, administrative law judge, or other employee who is or may reasonably be expected to be involved in the decisional process of the proceeding, an ex parte communication relevant to the merits of the proceeding;

# Ex Parte Communications:

## Hypothetical 3 A 4

- 2010 MSAPA SECTION 408. EX PARTE COMMUNICATIONS.
- (a) In this section, “final decision maker” means the person with the power to issue a final order in a contested case.
- (b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), (d), (e), or (h), while a contested case is pending, the presiding officer and the final decision maker may not make to or receive from any person any communication concerning the case without notice and opportunity for all parties to participate in the communication. For the purpose of this section, a contested case is pending from the issuance of the agency’s pleading or from an application for an agency decision, whichever is earlier.
- (c) A presiding officer or final decision maker may communicate about a pending contested case with any person if the communication is required for the disposition of ex parte matters authorized by statute or concerns an uncontested procedural issue.

# Ex Parte Communications: Hypothetical 3 A 5

- Board of Trustees of the University of Arkansas v. Secretary of Health and Human Services
- 354 F. Supp.2d 924, 937-938 (E.D. Ark., 2005). (ALJ held prehearing meeting with two employees of Medicare contractor that was party to Medicare hearing outside the presence of other parties to the hearing. The court held that this was an improper ex parte communication under 5 U.S. C. Section 557(d)(1)(A),(B), and the ALJ failed to place on the public record of the proceeding a memorandum stating the substance of the communications with the two employees[ contrary to the requirements of 5 U.S.C. Section 557(d)(1)(C)(ii).]. The District Court did not reverse the agency decision solely because of ex parte communications, but it did rule that on remand the case should be assigned to a different ALJ to avoid the appearance of impropriety.).

# Ex Parte Communications:

## Hypothetical 3 B 1

- B) In the case of Dept. VA v. Johnson, Jones receives a telephone call from lawyer White, representing psychologist Johnson, in which White states: “The complaining witness, Stevens, is dangerous to other people as he threatened both myself and my client with bodily harm if we showed up at the hearing in this case. The hearing is tomorrow. Can you request police presence at the hearing to watch Stevens at all times?”

# Ex Parte Communications:

## Hypothetical 3 B 2

- Mathew Zaheri Corp. v. New Motor Vehicle Bd., 55 Cal. App. 4<sup>th</sup> 1305, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 705 (1997). Attorney's ex parte communication to administrative law judge of fear for attorney's safety based on behavior of opposing party was improper, as was ALJ's failure to disclose communication, but it was not improper to grant rehearing of protest of franchisee because of improper ex parte communication.
-

# Ex Parte Communications:

## Hypothetical 3 C 1

- C) In the case of Dept VA v. Melville, Judge Jones presides at the hearing held in a rural county federal government office. During the lunch break, Judge Jones has lunch with the federal agency attorney, the court reporter, and the agency representative. There is a spirited discussion. Defense counsel, Lowan, and the doctor, Melville, sit at another table, and observe that the ALJ and the government attorney are very friendly, and tell jokes during lunch. When the hearing reconvenes, if Lowan objects to the lunch room interaction, what should the ALJ do?



# Ex Parte Communications:

## Hypothetical 3 C 2

- 8. Wells v. Del Norte School Dist. C-7, 753 P.2d 770 (Colo. 1987). Teacher was entitled to a new hearing from the school board, based on appearance of lack of impartiality that occurred when hearing officer sat at restaurant table and had ex parte conversations with counsel for school board and school board's witness during lunch break at removal hearing.

# Ex Parte Communications:

## Hypothetical 3 C 3

- Vandegriff v. First Savings & Loan Ass'n 617 S.W. 2d 669 (Tex. 1981). Savings and Loan charter applicant met with Texas Savings & Loan Commissioner after first application had been rejected by Commissioner. Applicants presented new information to Commissioner. Shortly thereafter, applicants filed a second application which was ultimately accepted by Commissioner, and a new charter was issued. The Texas Supreme Court held that this was not an improper ex parte communication because there was no current contested case at the time of the communications, and no prejudice occurred because the ex parte communications information was disclosed at the second hearing, and there was an opportunity for opponents of the charter application to counter, or present contrary information at the second hearing.



# Reasonable doubts about judge's impartiality Hypothetical 4 A 1

- 4. ALJ Jones is newly appointed to a federal agency. Prior to his appointment, Jones was a federal agency prosecutor for fifteen years who prosecuted numerous license revocation and suspension cases and who appeared numerous times before the agency as trial counsel in revocation and suspension hearings. Jones was known as a vigorous advocate of protecting the public from unscrupulous doctors and psychologists. ALJ Jones has not been assigned to any cases in which he was agency counsel, and he has not heard any professional licensing cases in his first year as an ALJ.
- 
- A) Judge Jones has been assigned to hear a physician licensing revocation case against Dr. Williams. Chuck, counsel for Dr. Williams, moves to disqualify Jones on the grounds that Jones has a pro-prosecution bias based on his years of experience in the attorney general's office. Chuck asserts that ALJ Jones impartiality might reasonably be questioned. What should Judge Jones do?
-

# Reasonable doubts about judge's impartiality Hypothetical 4 A 2

- **D.C. Rules of Jud. Conduct Rule 2.11**
- **CANON 2 A JUDGE SHALL PERFORM THE DUTIES OF JUDICIAL OFFICE IMPARTIALLY, COMPETENTLY, AND DILIGENTLY**
- **Rule 2.11 Disqualification .**
- **(A) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to the following circumstances:**
- **(1) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer, or personal knowledge\* of facts that are in dispute in the proceeding.**

# Reasonable doubts about judge's impartiality Hypothetical 4 A 2

- Andrews v. ALRB 28 Cal. 3d 781 (1981): “The California supreme court held that: (1) administrative law officer's practice of law with law firm which had represented individual farm workers in suit against the Secretary of Labor and which engaged in employment discrimination suits on behalf of Mexican-Americans, even if it could be taken as evidence of his political or social outlook, was not a ground for his disqualification; (2) mere appearance of bias was not a ground for disqualification; (3) temporary status of administrative law officer could not be used as an element in a showing of bias; (4) allegation that some of administrative law officer's findings were not supported by substantial evidence did not provide grounds for disqualification; and (5) administrative law officer's reliance on certain witnesses and rejection of others could not be evidence of bias no matter how consistently he rejected or doubted the testimony produced by one of the adversaries.” [syllabus of Cal Supreme court opinion].
- **[social and political background and legal experience not grounds for disqualification].**

# Reasonable doubts about judge's impartiality Hypothetical 4 B 1

- B) Judge Jones has been assigned to hear a psychologist license revocation case, in which a psychologist is charged with aiding an unlicensed person in a “rebirthing experience” in which a ten year old child died from asphyxiation. Prior to becoming an ALJ, Jones was National Vice President of “Parents against Exploitation of Children,” a national advocacy organization that seeks to outlaw alternative treatment schemes like rebirthing for children who are victims of child abuse. Jones has resigned from the organization upon taking office as an ALJ. What should Judge Jones do? Should he disclose the prior association? Should he recuse himself from this case?



# Reasonable doubts about judge's impartiality Hypothetical 4 B 2

- D.C. Rules of Jud. Conduct Rule 2.11
- **CANON 2 A JUDGE SHALL PERFORM THE DUTIES OF JUDICIAL OFFICE IMPARTIALLY, COMPETENTLY, AND DILIGENTLY**
- 
- **Rule 2.11 Disqualification .**
- 
- **(A) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which**
- **The judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to the following circumstances:**
- **(6) The judge:**
- **(a) served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or was associated with a lawyer who participated substantially as a lawyer in the matter during such association;**
- **(b) served in governmental employment, and in such capacity participated personally and substantially as a lawyer or public official concerning the proceeding, or has publicly expressed in such capacity an opinion concerning the merits of the particular matter in controversy;**
- **(c) was a material witness concerning the matter; or**
- **(d) previously presided as a judge over the matter in another court.**

# Reasonable doubts about judge's impartiality Hypothetical 4 B 3

- Williams v. Pennsylvania 136 S.Ct. 1899
- ( June 9, 2016). Former prosecutor (elected district attorney) who approved capital charges against defendant Williams violated due process of law when, as chief Justice of Pennsylvania Supreme Court, he denied recusal motion brought by Williams lawyer and participated in decision to reinstate death penalty sentence against Williams which had been stayed by lower courts because of Brady violations. The judge's prior involvement as a prosecutor violated due process of law because there was an impermissible risk of actual bias when a judge earlier had significant, personal involvement as a prosecutor in a critical decision regarding the defendant's case.

# Reasonable doubts about judge's impartiality Hypothetical 4 B 4

- Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp. 486 U. S. 847 (1988). U.S. Supreme Court vacated a judgment on the merits in a case in which the court held that the trial court judge violated 28 U.S.C. Section 455 (a) (“judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned” standard ) by deciding a case, and not disqualifying himself. The judge was a member of the Board of Trustees of Loyola University, and Loyola, although not a party to the lawsuit, stood to benefit financially if the judge ruled in favor of one of the litigants in a dispute over ownership of a certificate of need for a new hospital. The judge ruled in favor of that party and resolved credibility issues in favor of that party.

# Reasonable doubts about judge's impartiality Hypothetical 4 C 1

- C) Judge Jones is assigned to hear a case in which a federal environmental agency seeks \$100,000 in civil penalties against Big Oil company for oil seepage into a lake next to the refinery. Prior to hearing this case, Judge Jones attended a three day national conference sponsored by Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF) which addressed environmental law related issues. Big Oil Co. donates \$500,000 per year to PLF, which is 5% of PLF's annual budget . PLF paid for Judges Jones airfare, and hotel lodging expenses, to attend the conference. Many of the conference speakers discussed topics that were generally relevant to environmental law issues that would come before Judge Jones. What should Judge Jones do? Should he disclose the prior association? Should he recuse himself from this case?

# Reasonable doubts about judge's impartiality Hypothetical 4 C 2

- 3. In Re Maria Aguinda, 241 F. 3d 194 (2d Cir., 2001) Court of Appeal denied plaintiff's petition for writ of mandamus to direct a district court judge to recuse himself from deciding action brought by plaintiffs against Texaco for environmental damage in two foreign countries. The basis for recusal was that the judge attended an expense paid seminar that was funded by nonprofit foundations but that was sponsored by an organization that received general funding from Texaco, the defendant in the lawsuit, and at which seminar one of the speakers was the former chief executive officer for Texaco. The mandamus petition was denied because the topics discussed at the seminar had no bearing on any issue that is material to resolution of the claims or defenses in the lawsuit, and because defendant Texaco's involvement in the seminar was too remote, that is it had an indirect and minor funding role. .



# Bias, Prejudice: Hypothetical 5 A 1

- 5. ALJ Jones is newly appointed to the federal agency regulating pharmacists on military bases. Judge Jones, a Vietnam veteran, was a civil trial attorney who defended medical malpractice cases prior to becoming an ALJ. Jones was also a POW, who was held in the same prison camp as Senator John McCain. Judge Jones is assigned to hear a pharmacist license revocation case in which a Vietnamese pharmacist, James Lam, is charged with negligently mixing liquid antibiotics which were contaminated and which led to the death of five children.
- A) Pharmacist Lam testified during the hearing that he carefully mixed the proper antibiotics, and he denied that he was negligent in any fashion. Lam's testimony, brought out by his attorney, Frank, was very persuasive in supporting Mr. Lam's defense. Judge Jones asked Mr. Lam where he received his training. Lam replied that he was trained in Hanoi, North Vietnam, and then later on as an expatriate in Paris, France. Judge Jones then stated for the record that "He, Judge Jones, could never find to be truthful the testimony of citizens of North Vietnam, regardless of how believable their testimony was, because of his POW experience." What should Judge Jones do at this point? Can Judge Jones ethically continue to hear and decide this case?

# Bias, Prejudice: Hypothetical 5 A 2

- **D.C. Rules of Jud. Conduct Rule 2.11**
- **CANON 2 A JUDGE SHALL PERFORM THE DUTIES OF JUDICIAL OFFICE IMPARTIALLY, COMPETENTLY, AND DILIGENTLY**
- 
- **Rule 2.11 Disqualification .**
- 
- **(A) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which**
- **The judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to the following circumstances:**
- 
- **(1) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer, or personal knowledge\* of facts that are in dispute in the proceeding.**

# Bias, Prejudice: Hypothetical 5 A 3

- **CANON 2 A JUDGE SHALL PERFORM THE DUTIES OF JUDICIAL**
- **OFFICE IMPARTIALLY, COMPETENTLY, AND DILIGENTLY**  
**DC Rules of Jud. Conduct Rule 2.2**
- **Rule 2.2. Impartiality and Fairness**
- 
- **A judge shall uphold and apply the law,\* and shall perform all duties of judicial office fairly and impartially.\***
- 
- **Rules of Jud. Conduct Rule 2.3**
- **Rule 2.3. Bias, Prejudice, and Harassment**
- **(A) A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office, including administrative duties, without bias or prejudice.**

# Bias, Prejudice: Hypothetical 5 A 4

- **DC Rules of Jud. Conduct Rule 2.3**
- **Rule 2.3. Bias, Prejudice, and Harassment**
- **(B) A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice, or engage in harassment, including but not limited to bias, prejudice, or harassment based upon race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, marital status, socioeconomic status, or political affiliation, and shall not permit court staff, court officials, or others subject to the judge's direction and control to do so....**

# Bias, Prejudice: Hypothetical 5 A 5

- **DC Rules of Jud. Conduct Rule 2.6**
- **Rule 2.6. Ensuring the Right to Be Heard**
- 
- **(A) A judge shall accord to every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, or that person's lawyer, the right to be heard according to law.\***

# Bias, Prejudice: Hypothetical 5 A 6

- Berger v. U.S., 255 U.S. 22 (1921). Judge had no lawful right or power to preside as judge on the trial of three defendants upon their indictment under the Espionage Act, when judge publicly stated his animosity to German-Americans as those persons whose “hearts reek with disloyalty”. This is a showing of personal bias and prejudice against those defendants’ national origins that is sufficient to disqualify that judge

# Bias, Prejudice: Hypothetical 5 B 1

- B) Later on, in pharmacist Lam's testimony, the agency attorney started cross-examination as to Lam's pharmacy practices. Judge Jones stepped in, told the AG to sit down and Judge Jones started conducting his own very vigorous cross-examination of the pharmacist. When Lam's attorney objected to specific questions, the judge overruled every objection, and continued the cross-examination until it was finished. Both the agency attorney and Lam's Attorney objected to the judge's cross-examination. When asked why he took over the cross examination, Judge Jones replied that he had been a pretty good trial attorney himself, and that he did a better job on cross-examination than either attorney. Has Judge Jones violated any ethical provisions in this cross-examination?

# Bias, Prejudice: Hypothetical 5 B 2

- DC Rules of Jud. Conduct Rule 2.6
- Rule 2.6. Ensuring the Right to Be Heard
- 
- (A) A judge shall accord to every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, or that person's lawyer, the right to be heard according to law.\*

# Bias, Prejudice: Hypothetical 5 B 3

- Dayoub v. Com., State Dental Council and Examining Bd., 70 Pa. Commw. 621, 453 A. 2d 751 (1982). Dentist was denied fair hearing before a fair tribunal when the record of proceedings before the state Dental Council and Examining Board revealed several occasions during which member or members of Board heatedly questioned dentist and argued with him in such manner that their behavior was much more in line with that of prosecuting attorney than of neutral, detached and impartial decisionmaker.



# Bias, Prejudice: Hypothetical 5 B 4

- Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Pitts, 815 So.2d 738 (Fla. App. 1 Dist., May 2, 2002) Motorist successfully challenged on judicial review motor vehicle agency order suspending motorist's driver's license because motorist was denied procedural due process rights at administrative hearing. Hearing officer denied motorists' attorney's right to examine arresting police officer about circumstances of DUI arrest, and to examine blood alcohol test operator when hearing officer substantially restricted attorneys' questioning by ruling that questions were not relevant. Hearing officer also asked questions of police officer in support of agency position in hearing, and therefore hearing officer departed from the role of a neutral and detached impartial decision maker in violation of due process of law.

# Bias, Prejudice: Hypothetical 5 B 5

- Tele-Trip Co. v. N. L. R. B., 340 F. 2d 575 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1965).  
Petitioner wanted to set aside the order of the National Labor Relations Board, when Tele-Trip Co. complaining that they were denied a fair hearing because of the conduct of the examiner. The court refused to set aside the order although the manner in which the examiner conducted the hearing called for critical comment when examiner persistently interrupted the examination of witnesses, (approximately sixty times to ask questions), assumed the responsibility of taking over the interrogation in argumentative fashion; on occasion displayed a critical approach, and showed attitude closely bordering on partisanship or even hostility

# Bias, Prejudice: Hypothetical 5 B 6

- 14. People v. Perkins 109 Cal. App. 4<sup>th</sup> 1562, 1Cal. Rptr. 3d 271 (2003). The California Court of Appeal reversed a criminal conviction and granted a new trial based on judicial misconduct which deprived the defendant of the right to a fair trial, and the due process right to an impartial Judge. The Court concluded that the trial judge was “intemperate in his examination of appellant [defendant] and that ... the judge prejudicially interfered with the defense, and conducted himself as though he sided with the People [prosecution].”

# Bias, Prejudice: Hypothetical 5 C 1

- C) After the hearing is completed, Judge Jones started to write his proposed decision, when he received a telephone call from a journalist writing an expose of the pharmacy case, which was very newsworthy because of the deaths of children. The journalist promised not to publish the story until the judge's decision had been approved by the state pharmacy board. The judge agreed to the interview, and he was quoted as stating: 1) " Pharmacist Lam was one of the worst, most unbelievable witnesses that he had seen give trial testimony in his years of trial practice"; and that 2) "Children died through gross negligence at this pharmacy, this is unconscionable, and someone should pay for this." Judge Jones proposed decision recommended revocation of the pharmacist's license, and this decision was approved by the state pharmacy board. The interview with Judge Jones was then published as part of a larger story in a major daily newspaper. Has Judge Jones violated any ethical provisions in giving this interview, and making the statements reported in the story?

# Bias, Prejudice: Hypothetical 5 C 2

- DC Rules of Jud. Conduct Rule 2.10
- Rule 2.10. Judicial Statements on Pending and Impending Cases
- (A) A judge shall not make any public statement that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome or impair the fairness of a matter pending\* or impending\* in any court, or make any nonpublic statement that might substantially interfere with a fair trial or hearing.
- (B) A judge shall not, in connection with cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to come before the court, make pledges, promises, or commitments that are inconsistent with the impartial\* performance of the adjudicative duties of judicial office.

# Bias, Prejudice: Hypothetical 5 C 3

- U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F. 3d 34 (D.C. Cir., 2001). The Court of Appeal disqualified district court judge from hearing case on remand because judge made extensive comments to media representatives while the case was pending before the judge. The Court of appeal concluded that the district court judge had violated the following ethics provisions: “Canon 3A(6) of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges requires federal judges to “avoid public comment on the merits of pending or impending” cases. Canon 2 tells judges to “avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities,” on the bench and off. Canon 3A(4) forbids judges to initiate or consider *ex parte* communications on the merits of pending or impending proceedings. Section 455(a) of Title 28 of the Judicial Code requires judges to recuse themselves when their “impartiality might reasonably be questioned”.”253 F. 3d at page 107.



# Bias, Prejudice: Hypothetical 5 D 1

- D). Judge Smith is an ALJ presiding at the hearing in *Gonzales v. Blank Jewelers*, a sexual harassment case adjudicated under the EEOC statute (fair employment act) statute. Plaintiff Gonzales is both female, and working in California without a valid work visa. Gonzales testified to the events in question, in which a supervisor at work repeatedly grabbed her at work and asked her to have sexual relations with him, and she repeatedly refused, and asked the supervisor to stop touching her, and to stop talking to her like that. After that testimony, Judge Smith made comments on the record in two categories: 1) these sexual harassment cases are a waste of taxpayer money and agency resources; Judge Smith hoped that plaintiff understood how serious these charges were, that the male defendant had a family to support, and that she understood how easy it was for women to fabricate he said/she said claims that would destroy the career of the charged male defendant; and 2) Gonzales was ungrateful to her employer who provided her a job even though she was an illegal alien, and that she should not sue her employer because she broke the law as well. Has Judge Smith violated any ethical provisions in making these comments?

# Bias, Prejudice: Hypothetical 5 D 2

- **DC Rules of Jud. Conduct Rule 2.3**
- **Rule 2.3. Bias, Prejudice, and Harassment**
- **(B) A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice, or engage in harassment, including but not limited to bias, prejudice, or harassment based upon race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, marital status, socioeconomic status, or political affiliation, and shall not permit court staff, court officials, or others subject to the judge's direction and control to do so....**

# Bias, Prejudice: Hypothetical 5 D 3

- Fitch v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 9 Cal. 4<sup>th</sup> 552, 887 P. 2d 937, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 581 (1995). Judge was publicly censured by commission on Judicial Performance for inappropriate statements and conduct with court employees and attorneys. Censure was upheld by Calif. Supreme Court. The judge's improper conduct included such examples as telling one court reporter, "Your butt looks good in that dress"; telling another court reporter, "I certainly hope you're not that frigid at home with your husband"; Also, judge slapped or patted a court reporter and a court trainee on their buttocks.



# Bias, Prejudice: Hypothetical 5 D 4

- Hernandez v. Paicius, 109 Cal. App. 4<sup>th</sup> 452, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 756 (Calif. Court of Appeal, 2003). The California Court of Appeal reversed the lower court judgment without a showing of prejudice because the trial judge made numerous comments about the residency status of the plaintiff which reflected stereotypes about illegal aliens and that raised questions about the fairness and impartiality of the judicial proceedings. The appellate court also ordered that the case be reassigned to another judge upon remand.

# Bias, Prejudice: Hypothetical 5 D 5

- Catchpole v. Brannon, 36 Cal. App. 4<sup>th</sup> 237, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 440 (California Court of Appeal, 1995) The California Court of Appeal reversed the lower court judgment based on denial of the due process right to an impartial decision maker. This is because the trial judge made numerous comments about the plaintiff which reflected stereotypes about the nature and roles of men and women, and which showed gender bias on the part of the judge. This satisfied the reasonable doubts about the impartiality of the judge standard for reversal of the judgment, and remand of the case to a different judge.

# Separation of functions:

## Hypothetical 6 A 1

- A) ALJ Miller is an employee of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Department (ABC) in the adjudication division. Miller is assigned to adjudicate a proceeding brought by ABC against Hank's Bar, which serves alcoholic beverages and offers topless dancers for entertainment. Hank's is charged with violating ABC regulations that limit contact between dancers and bar patrons. ABC sought a six month suspension of Hank's ABC license. At the hearing, Hanks' lawyer, Bob, raised a constitutional challenge (due process of law) based on bias to the authority of ALJ Miller as an ABC employee, to hear the case. What should Miller do? Should he/she accept or reject the challenge? Can ALJ Miller rule on constitutional issues?



# Separation of functions:

## Hypothetical 6 A 2

- 1. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (Federal APA separation of functions provisions)
- 
- (d) The employee who presides at the reception of evidence pursuant to section 556 of this title shall make the recommended decision or initial decision required by section 557 of this title, unless he becomes unavailable to the agency. Except to the extent required for the disposition of ex parte matters as authorized by law, such an employee may not--
  - (1) consult a person or party on a fact in issue, unless on notice and opportunity for all parties to participate; or
  - (2) be responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction of an employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency....

# Separation of functions:

## Hypothetical 6 A 3

- 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (Federal APA separation of functions provisions) [continued]
- 
- An employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency in a case may not, in that or a factually related case, participate or advise in the decision, recommended decision, or agency review pursuant to section 557 of this title, except as witness or counsel in public proceedings. This subsection does not apply--
  - (A) in determining applications for initial licenses;
  - (B) to proceedings involving the validity or application of rates, facilities, or practices of public utilities or carriers; or
  - (C) to the agency or a member or members of the body comprising the agency.

# Separation of functions:

## Hypothetical 6 A 4

- 1. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975) state medical licensing agency did not violate due process of law when board could both investigate and then later adjudicate licensing suspension proceeding against physician for violating abortion laws. Institutional combination of both investigative, prosecutorial and adjudicative functions in one agency did not violate due process of law because there was no unconstitutional risk of bias in the agency structure. The court noted that internally different employees performed the investigation and prosecutorial responsibilities for the Board. Also, Board's exposure to evidence at investigative stage, and Board's determination that there was probable cause to believe that doctor had violated law, did not mean that board violated due process of law and that board could not be fair to doctor in adversary hearing stage.



# Separation of functions:

## Hypothetical 6 A 5

- Walker v. City of Berkeley, 951 F. 2d 182 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir., 1991). Discharged city employee who challenged discharge on wrongful termination grounds both in court under Section 1983, and through city administrative hearing process was denied due process of law when city staff attorney acted both as advocate for city in Section 1983 court lawsuit, and as decision maker in local administrative process.
-

# Separation of functions:

## Hypothetical 6 A 6

- Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board of California, 99 Cal. App. 4<sup>th</sup> 880, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 729 (2002). ABC licensee challenged assignment of department ALJ to hear license suspension case brought by Department against licensee for violating no contact regulations that apply to licensees' which serve alcoholic beverages and offer topless dancers for entertainment.. Licensee argued that there was no statutory authority for department to appoint staff ALJ to hear case, and alternatively, that if there was such statutory authority, that the appointment of an ALJ who worked for the Department that prosecuted the suspension action violated the due process of law right to an impartial decision maker. The court rejected both challenges holding that there was statutory authority to appoint a staff ALJ, and that due process of law was not violated by the appointment of a Department staff ALJ. Employment of the ALJ, and payment of the ALJ's salary by the Department did not create a risk of bias, that the ALJ would tend to favor the Department.

# Pro Se Litigants:Hypothetical 6B1

- B) ALJ Goodman, a staff employee of the ABC Department has been assigned to hear the case of ABC v. Willies' Bar, Inc., in which the Department is seeking to suspend Willies' license for 90 days for selling alcohol to minors. At the hearing, Willies' Bar, Inc., President, Jack, entered an appearance on behalf of Willies. Jack, who was not an attorney, sought to represent Willies at the hearing? What should ALJ Goodman do at this point? Allow non attorney representation of Willies by Jack? What problems will Goodman encounter in a pro se litigant hearing as contrasted with a hearing in which an attorney represents the licensee?



# Pro Se Litigants: Hypothetical 6B2

- Camille v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board, 99 Cal. App. 4<sup>th</sup> 1094, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 758 (2002). ABC licensee challenged in court revocation of license for selling beer to underage minors. Licensee's challenge was based, in part, on argument that ABC Department lacked jurisdiction to revoke license because licensee was not represented by attorney during hearing. Licensee was represented at hearing by non-attorney president of corporation that held liquor license. Court rejected licensee's argument, and held that while corporations must be represented by attorneys in courts of records (except small claims courts), this requirement does not apply to administrative agencies and tribunals so that it was not improper for the non-attorney President of corporate licensee to represent licensee in revocation hearing.



# Honesty: Hypothetical 6 C 1

- C) ALJ Stevens is a WCJ who adjudicates workers' compensation cases before the state WCAB. Stevens is required to submit 90 day decision affidavits at the end of each pay period. Relevant agency regulations require WCJ's to certify that he/she has no outstanding decisions which are older than 90 days that have not been filed in the record. Stevens has filed several such affidavits based on submitting decisions 90 days or less in long hand written form to his administrative assistant, when the regulations requires that the decisions be typed, signed, and officially filed. Does Stevens have any ethical problems with this practice?

# Honesty: Hypothetical 6 C 2

- Young v. Gannon, 97 Cal. App. 4<sup>th</sup> 209, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 187 (2002). Worker's compensation Judge (WCJ), who was terminated for dishonesty, neglect of duty, incompetence, and inappropriate behavior with attorneys who appeared before him, challenged termination in court. Termination was upheld. The Court of Appeal concluded that there was substantial evidence supporting the agency findings related to dishonesty. The WCJ was found to have been dishonest in falsely completing 90 day decision affidavits (Cal. Labor Code S 123.5(a)), and he was found to have acted inappropriately toward two female attorneys who appeared before the judge by initiating dating and friendship relationships with those attorneys without disclosing the relationships and/or recusing himself from cases in which those two attorneys appeared before the judge. .

# Personal and professional relationships: Hypothetical 6 D 1

- D) ALJ Josephson is male and newly single, and wants to start dating, and or develop friendships with females. Josephson knows several single female attorneys who regularly appear before his agency, the state WCAB. Would Josephson encounter any ethical problems if he developed personal relationships with either or both of these attorneys, on a friendship or dating basis? Does he have to disclose these friendship or dating relationships when these attorneys appear before him. Should he recuse himself from any hearing in which they appear before him? Is he better off not mixing professional and personal relationships?
- 
-

# Personal and professional relationships: Hypothetical 6 D 2

- Young v. Gannon 97 Cal. App. 4<sup>th</sup> 209 at page 215: “Appellant also engaged in inappropriate conduct toward two female attorneys who appeared before him. State Compensation Insurance Fund Attorney Nona Rentzer (Rentzer) appeared in WCAB cases before appellant from July through September 1996. Appellant was interested in pursuing a relationship with her. In July 1996, he asked Rentzer to come into his chambers during a conference. For 30 to 40 minutes, while the other attorneys involved in the conference waited, he engaged her in a personal conversation. As she was leaving his chambers, he gave her a card with his telephone number on it and invited her to lunch and the shooting range. Thereafter, he telephoned her at least half a dozen times, sent her greeting cards and sought her out when she had appearances before the WCAB. Appellant's conduct made Rentzer uncomfortable. She was afraid, however, that if she did anything to anger him he would harm her.
- Appellant had been trained in disclosure requirements and recusal obligations as well as judicial ethics. Despite his training, he did not recuse himself from cases in which Rentzer was appearing. Neither did he disclose to the parties that he had a personal interest in Rentzer. He attempted to justify his behavior by stating that Rentzer's appearances before him were at “uncontested” settlement conferences, even though adversarial parties were involved in those settlement conferences. Appellant's conduct was persistent and conveyed an appearance of impropriety.”

# The Humorous Judge 7 1

- 7. **The Humorous Judge**: Judge Green presided over a state administrative hearing in which a parent was seeking to have his name removed from a state child abuse registry. The parent had been placed to the list for corporal punishment, spanking their child with a paddle that left bruises on the child. The parent's argument was that corporal punishment was necessary to discipline children. The Judge humorously quipped "Spare the rod, and Spoil the Child?" and laughter broke out in the hearing room. The parent thought the judge was mocking him, and asked the judge what he meant by that. The judge humorously added "If I tell you, I will have to kill you" ( a line from a movie). The judge then explained that he was kidding and that telling jokes sometimes eased the tension in these hearings which could otherwise be pretty grim. (hypothetical based on judicial humor in a death penalty case: People v. Monterroso (2004) 34 Cal. 4<sup>th</sup> 743, 762, 101 P. 3<sup>rd</sup> 956, 22 Cal. Rptr 3d 1 "...even well conceived judicial humor is best invoked in measured doses.")

# The Humorous Judge 7 2

- **DC Rules of Jud. Conduct Rule 2.8**
- **Rule 2.8. Decorum, Demeanor, and Communication With Jurors**
- **(A) A judge shall require order and decorum in proceedings before the court.**
- **(B) A judge shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, court staff, court officials, and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity, and shall require similar conduct of lawyers, court staff, court officials, and others subject to the judge's direction and control.**

# The activist judge 8 1

- 8. **The Activist Judge:** Judge Smith is a long time Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) administrative law judge who has heard hundreds of administrative hearings in which motorists licenses were suspended for driving while intoxicated. In 2000, Judge Smith lost his adult daughter in an auto accident caused by a drunk driver. His daughter was a passenger in another car that collided with the drunk's car, and she was killed. Since that loss, Judge Smith has become an active member of Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) and he has lobbied for tougher laws in the state legislature particularly a .08 blood alcohol level law. Judge Smith has just been elected state wide president of MADD for his state. Judge Smith has heard 200 license suspension cases since his daughter was killed, and he has not disclosed the loss of his daughter nor his MADD activities in any of those cases.



# The activist judge 8 2

- **DC Rules of Jud. Conduct Rule 2.4**
- **Rule 2.4. External Influences on Judicial Conduct**
- **(A) A judge shall not be swayed by public clamor or fear of criticism.**
- **(B) A judge shall not permit family, social, political, financial, or other interests or relationships to influence the judge's judicial conduct or judgment.**
- **(C) A judge shall not convey or permit others to convey the impression that any person or organization is in a position to influence the judge.**

# Other Hypotheticals 1

- 1. ALJ Jones hears disability benefits cases and is assigned to hear a case in which the claimant has challenged the termination of his disability benefits. The claimant, Bill, is 5'6" and weighs 300 lbs. Bill's disability conditions include obesity and diabetes. Bill claims that he has a medical condition that makes it very difficult to lose weight. Judge Jones writes a decision which upholds the agency's decision to terminate benefits. In that decision, Judge Jones refers to Bill as a "well-nourished man, who obviously never misses a meal." Judge Ames, who is new, reviews the decision pursuant to a system where each proposed decision is proofread by another judge before it is issued. Judge Ames objects to this language and requests that Jones change it. Jones responds: "But I write like a dream!" and says that Ames has no business telling an experienced judge how to write.
- 
- 1. Does the language used by Jones violate any ethical principles?
- 
- 2. Has Jones violated controlling anti-discrimination law by use of the language?
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- 3. If Jones does not change the language, what, if anything, should Ames do?
-

# Other Hypotheticals 2

- 2 ALJ Green, an immigration judge, was assigned to hear an asylum case. The claimant, Steve, had been a judge in Columbia, where he received numerous death threats. At the hearing, Steve offered evidence of a well-founded fear of persecution if he was deported. In the decision upholding the asylum claim, Judge Green referred to Steve as an “illegal alien” who was trying to avoid deportation. Judge Brass reviewed Judge Green’s decision and criticized the use of that term, claiming that it showed bias against immigrants. Brass recommended that Green substitute the term “undocumented persons” for illegal alien. Brass is ready to report Green for illegal bias against immigrants, if Green does not change his decision.
- 
- 1. Does the language used by Green violate any ethical principles?
- 
- 2. Has Green violated controlling anti-discrimination law by use of the language?
- 
- 3. If Green does not change the language, what, if anything, should Brass do?
-

# Other Hypotheticals 3 1

- 3. ALJ Hall has presided at special education law hearings for the last five years, and has developed a great deal of experience and expertise. Hall's rulings that the District has the burden of proof have created some controversy (and the issue is currently on appeal to the US Supreme Court) but she is generally well respected by all of the attorneys working in the special education field. The Parents of Special Children (PSC) provides support for parents of special needs children. PSC also lobbies for the interests of children, and advocates for pro-child policies in the special education field. The group has issued an "ALJ of the Year" award to Judge Hall and invited her to speak at its annual conference in San Diego. PSC wants Judge Hall to speak for two hours on one day of the conference on the topic of due process hearings, including commenting upon what kind of evidence she likes to see. PSC leadership plans to give Judge Hall a \$1000 honorarium and has offered Judge Hall and her spouse free air travel, a free "suite," and free restaurant meals for the five days of the conference. It will be held at the Hotel Del Coronado in San Diego, a plush resort hotel.



# Other Hypotheticals 3 2

- 1. Can Judge Hall speak at the PSC conference without violating ethical standards applicable to ALJ's?
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- 2. Does Judge Hall need the permission of the agency for whom she works to attend the conference? To speak? To accept the award?
- 
- 3. Should Judge Hall accept the award?
- 
- 4. Should Judge Hall accept an honorarium for her speech?
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- 5. Should Judge Hall allow PSC to pay for her expenses? Her spouses

# Other Hypotheticals 4 1

- 4. ALJ Fox was an employee of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board (Board). The Board has adopted rules for the conduct of hearings and issuance of decisions. Judge Fox was assigned the case of Malone in which licensee Sam contested the imposition of a \$5,000 penalty for selling alcohol to an underage minor. The prosecutor, Miller, also worked for the Board. The Board's rules require ALJ's to issue Board-approved pre-hearing orders, and preclude ALJ's from issuing their own pre-hearing orders. The Board-approved orders limit the type of evidence that can be admitted when a licensee offers a "fake ID" defense. The order requires the presentation of the testimony of the employee who was shown the fake ID. If the employee is unavailable, other evidence of the fake ID defense can not be offered, even if there is a good reason for the employee's unavailability. Judge Fox chafed under this policy and wanted to issue his own pre-hearing order, permitting the offer of proof of the actual fake ID, coupled with an examination of the ID by the ALJ. Secondly, Board rules require the board prosecutor to draft a proposed decision (proposed findings and conclusions) that the ALJ is required to use in writing his or her own decision. Finally, the Board has an institutional review board (review ALJ's) who examine all ALJ decisions and written opinions to "ensure consistency in the opinions findings and conclusions." Judge Fox upheld a fake ID reasonable reliance defense in the Malone case, and overturned the \$5,000 penalty, based on his examination of the ID. The review judge rejected Fox's decision, and told Fox he would have to uphold the penalty or the decision would be vacated by the Board, and remanded to another ALJ.

# Other Hypotheticals 4 2

- 1. Do the Board's mandated pre-hearing orders improperly interfere with the decisional independence of Fox and his colleagues?
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- 2. Do Board mandated prosecutor proposed decisions violate the separation of functions requirements of the APA? Does the policy improperly interfere with decisional independence?
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- 3. Do Board mandated review judge procedures violate decisional independence? Does the review judge's action in Fox's penalty decision violate Malone's right to due process of law?

# Other Hypotheticals 5

- 5. Judge Brown was assigned to preside over the 8-member Dental Laboratory Board when it met to consider reinstatement of previously disciplined dental technicians. Brown sat at the middle of a long table, flanked by Board members. The table faced an audience of about 50 people, including a large class of dental technology students. While one of the petitioners, Bill, was testifying, the cell phone of Crown, one of the members, began to ring. Crown answered the phone, and began talking to the caller while remaining at the table. Bridge, a member sitting at the other end, became upset at Crown's behavior and stomped out of the room. While Brown considered what to do, Doe, another member, began to aggressively question Bill, then told him: "I have never heard such a lame excuse in my life— and you call yourself a certified dental tech!" Brown attempted to re-direct Doe, but Doe told Brown that she, Doe, had every right to question the petitioners in any form she chose. Judge Brown, feeling the tension rising in the room, told a joke about dentists. Doe, a dentist, was insulted and left the meeting. Bridge returned and asked that he be "brought up to speed" on whatever he missed. Bill's lawyer requested a new hearing. Brown denied the motion because a quorum had been present to hear Bill's petition.
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- What were Judge Brown's responsibilities in this situation?
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# Other Hypotheticals 6 1

- ALJ Watson is assigned to hear a license discipline case brought by the Cosmetology Board against Cosmetologist Jill, a hair stylist, for failure to maintain minimum sanitation standards. The Board alleged that many of Jill's customers suffered from head lice and ringworm, allegedly caused by failure to properly clean hair styling equipment. The Board was represented by a deputy attorney general (DAG). Jill represented herself. One week before the hearing, Jill e-mailed Judge Watson, and stated: "I can't afford a lawyer. Can you recommend one to me? If not, can I bring my husband to the hearing? Most of my clients are friends. They are going to write you letters telling you what a great hairstylist I am. Can I send the letters to your office address?" At the hearing, the DAG offered in evidence a series of written memos detailing complaints about Jill from customers that were received by telephone at the Board offices. The memos stated the name of the complainant, and the substance of the complaint, but not the date of the call, and not the identity of the board staff person who took the complaint. The DAG also offered the written report of the investigator who inspected the hair salon where Jill worked, which documented sanitation violations, but which did not identify whether those violations were found at Jill's work station or one of the other hair stylist's work station. The DAG did not produce the investigator to testify at the hearing, claiming that she was on vacation. When Judge Watson asked Jill if she wanted to say anything about the reports, she denied that she had done anything wrong, and then she said: "I will leave it in your hands, Judge." Jill offered testimony from her husband who stated what a great hairstylist his wife was, and also asked the judge: "please do not take Jill's license away." One week after the record closed, a number of letters from Jill's friends were received at Judge Watson's office. All of them contained the same type of statements as Jill's husband's comments at the hearing.



# Other Hypotheticals 6 2

- Judge Watson was troubled by the weak case put on the Board, and the weakness of the evidence presented by Jill. He decided that he would need more information to write a proposed decision, but did not know where to turn. Judge Watson considered how much help an old friend, who works as an investigator with Consumer Affairs, would be if he could track the guy down. Ultimately, he decided that other matters were more worthy of his immediate attention and put the file aside until “what to do about the mess comes to me.”
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- 1. What should Judge Watson have done about the email from Jill?
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- 2. Should the memos have been admitted in evidence? How about the investigator’s report?
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- 3. How could Judge Watson have conducted the hearing differently? Should he have required the DAG to put on witnesses? What about asking Jill questions or telling her that she needed more evidence?
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- 4. Whom can Judge Watson talk with about the case?
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- 5. What about the late arriving letters– may he consider them? Admit them?